The Falklands War

 

The Falkland Islands are a British possession 300 miles east of the southern tip of South America.  Britian had controlled them since 1833 and the small population (about 2000 at the time of the war) was strongly pro-British.  But Argentina pressed an old Spanish claim to the islands and the Argentine public nursed a deep grievance over them.  Argentina pressed a diplomatic campaign to line up international support and was succeeding.  The British government was deeply conflicted: they felt a sentimental attachment to the islanders, but Margaret Thatcher, wanting to cut expenses, was unwilling to spend resources on practical support.  It seemed that a Hong Kong-type deal was possible: Britian would cede sovereignty and lease back the islands.

Then events spun out of control.  Argentina occupied the islands in April 1982, at which point their international support evaporated.  The British mounted a military campaign that barely succeeded in booting the Argentinians back to the mainland.

It takes nothing away from British courage, ingenuity, and flexibility to say that the Argentinians lost the war as much as the British won it.  The Argentine Navy wanted the war and started it, but when the Brits sank their only cruiser, the General Belgrano, the Navy ran away.  The Army didn’t want to fight and never did.  It was the Air Force that saved Argentina’s honor.  But an air force cannot win a war on its own.  The Brits, on the other hand, took their losses, regrouped, and pressed on, often under horrible winter conditions.

Lawrence Freedman and Virginia Gamba-Stonehouse, Signals of War: The Falklands Conflict of 1982 (1991)

The authors, one British and the other Argentine, present the long backstory (going back to the 18^th century) and the behind-the-scenes story of the war and the diplomatic maneuvering prior to and during it.  The book’s focus is the high-level diplomatic, government, and military deliberations.  Battlefield events are briefly recounted, primarily to provide context.  Backed by extensive use of documents from both sides, Freedman and Gamba-Stonehouse make clear that miscommunication, mistrust, and (on the British side) indecision resulted in a war neither side wanted or expected.  Britian’s indecision left them with two things they had hoped to avoid: both a war and a costly permanent garrison.  Recommended.

Max Hastings and Simon Jenkins, The Battle for the Falklands (1983, with 1997 introduction)

The book starts with a sprightly and somewhat irreverent recap of the pre-war phase recounted in much greater detail in Signals of War.  Much of this part of the book is irreverent in the tradition of British political writing.  (Jeanne Kirkpatrick, the US ambassador to the UN, is described as “never one to waste good oil on troubled water.”)  

But the real strength of this book is its detailed account of the fighting (written mostly by Hastings, who accompanied the troops) and its level-headed analysis of the mistakes and lessons learned.  Their analysis anticipates the more detailed account of Signals of War.  Pretty astonishing, considering that it was published so shortly after the war. Highly recommended.

Ewen Southby-Tailyour, Exocet Falklands: The Untold Story of Special Forces Operations (2014)

Southby-Tailyour details a minor sideshow of the Falklands war: a failed attempt to destroy much-feared anti-shipping missiles by attacking an Argentine air base with special forces.

Special forces are best used in support of conventional ones, such as scouting and reconnaissance in advance of an attack.  But after the dramatic Israeli rescue of hostages at Entebbe Airport in 1976, and the SAS’s freeing of hostages at Iran’s London embassy in 1980, a mystique grew about special forces.  This led to some particularly hare-brained schemes to use small special forces detachments to destroy the Super Etendard aircraft and the anti-ship Exocet missiles they carried.  Royal Marine, yachtsman, and military historian Southby-Tailyour describes these operations in great detail, examines how poorly planned they were, and speculates on the motives of those who pushed for them.  Exhaustively researched, uses both British and Argentine sources.  Competently written, but probably of interest only to specialists and people who have gotten way too deep into the Falklands War.

 

Falklands War Memorial, Stanley, East Falkland Island.  Photo 2024 by the author.